This paper presents experimental evidence from a monetary sticky price economy in which output and inflation depend on expectations of future inflation. In the unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE) nominal demand shocks cause output and inflation to be white noise. In the experimental sessions, however, output and inflation display strong persistence and regular cyclical patterns. Such behavior emerges because subjects' inflation expectations in the experiments fail to be captured by rational expectations functions. Instead, the expectations functions of a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE), which assumes that agents use optimal but 'simple' forecast functions, captures subjects' expectations surprisingly well. Over time expectations seem to start deviating from RPE expectations but evidence in favor of convergence towards the REE remains weak, even after more than 100 model periods. For model parameterizations where the RPE fails to exist, subjects' inflation expectations are captured much better by rational expectations functions.
Introduction
Rational expectations models with nominal rigidities, workhorses of current macroeconomics, seem to have rather weak internal propagation mechanisms and therefore face substantial difficulties in matching the persistence inherent in output and inflation data. Especially, matching the reactions of output and inflation in response to nominal shocks has proven cumbersome (e.g. Chari et al. (2000) and Nelson (1998) ). 1 Whether this difficulty is the result of overly simplistic models, e.g., lack of important frictions, or the result of implausible assumptions about the behavior of economic agents, is an open issue. Earlier contributions suggest, however, that relaxing the assumption of rational expectations can substantially strengthen the internal propagation mechanisms of simple economic models, e.g., Evans and Ramey (1992) , Evans and Honkapohja (1993) , (2001), Sargent (1999) , Adam (2004) . 2 This paper studies a simple monetary sticky price economy with nominal demand shocks in the experimental laboratory and assesses whether deviations of expectations from rational expectations are an important factor contributing to the persistence of output and inflation.
Resorting to laboratory experiments is justified on the following grounds. First, expectations in the field remain largely unobservable, which makes it difficult to identify deviations from rational expectations. Second, without reference to a specific economic model, the economic relevance of identified deviations cannot be interpreted. Reaching consensus about the relevant economic model, however, seems difficult. Laboratory experiments have the paramount advantage that the economic model is true by definition and that agents' expectations can be made directly observable.
The economic model studied in this paper is extremely simple: a cashin-advance constraint causes agents to hold money in equilibrium and sticky prices cause nominal demand shocks to have real effects. Since prices are preset for one period only, the model displays 'New Classical' features under rational expectations, i.e., output reacts to unexpected money shocks only and inflation lags output by one period. As a result, the model does not generate persistent deviations of output and inflation in response to monetary shocks, thus, has a 'weak' internal propagation mechanism under rational expectations.
The model's temporary equilibrium equation implies that current output and inflation depend on lagged endogenous variables, agents' expectations of future inflation rates, and exogenous nominal demand shocks. 3 Thus, whenever expectations deviate form rational ones, output and inflation also deviate from the white noise prediction.
To test for the relevance of such deviations, subjects in the experiments are asked to predict future inflation rates. Subjects have an incentive to provide the best possible forecast because the payments they receive depend negatively on their forecast errors. Subjects' inflation forecasts are then substituted into the model's temporary equilibrium equation and determine a model-consistent outcome for output and inflation. The new output level and inflation rate is announced to subjects and thereafter the process repeats itself. Overall, 420 observations for output and inflation have been generated in the experiments and more than 4000 individual inflation forecasts have been collected.
Unlike predicted by the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), output and inflation in the baseline experiments show regular and persistent deviations from steady state. In particular, both variables display strong positive autocorrelation. Such behavior emerges because the inflation expectations of subjects participating in the experiments fail to be captured by the expectations functions implied by the REE. This occurs although the REE is determinate, expectationally stable in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , and has a very simple structure. One would expect these features facilitating coordination on the REE in the experiments.
The paper shows that instead subjects' inflation expectations are captured surprisingly well by a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE). The RPE assumes that agents use optimal but 'simple' forecasts, i.e., forecast functions that condition on a single explanatory variable only. 4 Interestingly, the REE forecast function itself is simple in this sense because it suggests conditioning inflation forecasts on lagged output. Nevertheless, the restriction to simple forecasts gives rise to an additional RPE in which agents condition inflation forecasts on lagged inflation. Given that agents do so, these forecasts outperform forecasts that condition on lagged output. 5 The forecast functions implied by this RPE capture the inflation expectations of subjects in the experiments extremely well. This RPE also predicts output and inflation to display persistent and regular cyclical deviations similar to those observed in the experiments.
Over time some divergence from the RPE in which agents condition forecasts on lagged inflation can be observed. Yet, evidence in favor of convergence to the REE remains weak, even after more than 100 model periods. With model parameterizations for which the RPE with forecast based on lagged inflation does not exist, subjects' inflation expectations are largely consistent with rational expectations.
The experiments show that for a considerable amount of time deviations of expectations from rational expectations can generate a powerful 'endogenous propagation mechanism'. Simple forecast functions seem to be able to capture the forecasts of relatively unexperienced forecasters fairly well and may be a key ingredient for explaining the persistence of output and inflation in response to nominal shocks implied by data. This paper has been inspired by and is related to the contributions of Marimon and Sunder ((1993), (1994) ) who study experimental overlapping generations economies to select between multiple Rational Expectations Equilibria. These authors analyze the relationship between the stability and instability of REE under adaptive learning schemes and the observed laboratory outcomes in a setting where agents expectations about future variables influence current economic outcomes. The present paper uses a similar setting with feedback from expectations but studies the relevance of deviations from rational expectations for the persistence of output and inflation.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the economic model and derives the temporary equilibrium equation. The rational expectations and restricted perceptions equilibrium are derived in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 explains how the experiments have been implemented and sections 6 and 7 discuss the experimental results. A conclusion briefly summarizes. Technical details can be found in the appendix.
A Simple Sticky Price Economy
I consider a simple variant of a monetary sticky price economy with monopolistic competition. This class of models has received considerable attention in monetary economics recently, e.g., Woodford (2003) .
The production sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms producing differentiated goods with a linear labor technology. Firms set prices one period in advance but can reoptimize prices every period. Households maximize discounted lifetime utility over consumption and leisure and are subject to a cash-in advance constraint, as in Svensson (1985) . Finally, the government generates random demand fluctuations by white noise changes in real money balances. The model has previously been analyzed in Adam (2003 Adam ( , 2004 ) and a more detailed description is given in appendix 9.1.
Optimal price setting behavior by monopolistic firms delivers a Phillips curve of the form
where Π t denotes the gross inflation rate, y t the output level, w(y t , E t Π t+1 ) the marginal cost of production, i.e., the equilibrium real wage, and σ ∈ (0, 1) the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the goods of different firms. The real wage w depends on labor demand, which is equal to output y t , and on workers' inflation expectations E t Π t+1 . Inflation expectations influence real marginal costs because of the cash-in-advance constraint faced by workers. Firms must thus forecast inflation two periods ahead even though prices are sticky for a single period only. The wage w(y t , E t Π t+1 ) demanded by workers is assumed to increase with labor demand y t and the expected inflation tax E t Π t+1 . 6
As long as the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, the demand side is given by a quantity equation, which implies that real demand equals real balances. Real money balances and output thus evolve according to
where τ t is an iid real cash injection of the government with small bounded support and small positive mean τ ≥ 0.
Linearizing equations (1) and (2) around the monetary steady state delivers an expectational difference equation in output and inflation:
where t−1 Π e t and t−1 Π e t+1 denote the (potentially non-rational) t − 1 expectations of inflation in period t and t + 1, respectively, and v t = τ t − τ is a 6 Sufficient conditions for this to be the case are given appendix 9.1. 7 See appendix 9.1 for details. mean zero real money shock. 8 The coefficients in equation (3) are given by
where Π ≥ 1 and y > 0 denote steady state inflation and output, respectively, and ε > 0 is the real wage elasticity of labor supply in the steady state.
Equation (3) describes the models' temporary equilibrium in the language of Grandmont (1988) , i.e., it determines current output and inflation as a function of predetermined variables and agents' expectations of future endogenous variables. This equation will be uses to implement the economy in the experimental laboratory.
Rational Expectations
Suppose agents' inflation expectations in equation (3) are rational. Then, as shown in Adam (2003) , there exists a stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in which
The REE displays 'New Classical' properties, i.e., output deviates from steady state only in response to unexpected monetary shocks. Moreover, since prices are predetermined, inflation is lagging output by one period. Overall, the behavior of output and inflation under rational expectations is rather simple and does not depend on the labor supply elasticity ε. Moreover, as shown in appendix 9.2, no other stationary REE exists.
Clearly, the present model cannot generate persistent deviations of output and inflation from steady state under rational expectations. 9 This inability, which is at odds with estimated impulse responses to monetary shocks, frequently motivates the introduction of more sophisticated price setting frictions, see the discussion in chapter 2 of Woodford (2003) .
As shown in Adam (2003) , the REE (6) is also expectationally stable (E-stable) in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . Least-squares and related learning procedures thus generate convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium.
The determinacy, learnability, and simplicity of the REE should facilitate coordination on the equilibrium in the experiments.
Restricted Perceptions
Instead of assuming rational forecasters, this section considers less sophisticated agents that use 'simple' forecast functions that are based on a single explanatory variable only. In particular, suppose agents consider the following restricted set of forecast models:
Model Π :
Agents thus forecast inflation either as a function of lagged output, i.e., when employing Model Y, or as a function of lagged inflation, i.e., when employing Model Π.
The restriction to simple forecast functions can be interpreted in several ways. First, it might reflect the prediction technology available to agents. Given that the subjects participating in the experiments are relatively unexperienced forecasters, this restriction might not be unrealistic. Alternatively, the restriction may be interpreted as a temporary phenomenon due to agents who perform a specification search for suitable forecast models. Conditioning forecasts either on output or on inflation may appear to be a natural starting point for such forecasters. Unsatisfactory prediction performance, however, may then lead to an enlargement of the set of considered forecast models.
Agents choose a simple forecast model from the class M ∈ {Y, M} but also the model parameters (α M , β M ). In equilibrium agents choose the model and the parameter values that minimize the mean squared forecast errors associated with their forecast, as is the case in a rational expectations equilibrium. 10 Formally,
{Y, Π}) is a stationary sequence {y t , Π t } ∞ t=0 generated by equation (3) 
Clearly, without the restriction to the class of simple forecast models (7) a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) is a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE): a forecast function that outperforms all possible forecast functions is a rational forecast function.
Note that the class of simple forecast models (7) does not rule out that agents hold rational expectations. As shown in section 3, expectations of the simple form (7a) generate rational expectations whenever α * y = 0 and
There can exist, however, a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium that is not a Rational Expectations Equilibrium. Suppose agents use Model Π for forecasting, i.e.,
where the 2-step forecast is obtained by iterating on the 1-step forecast function. Substituting these expectations into the temporary equilibrium (3) delivers
and shows that inflation then depends on lagged inflation and on lagged output. The latter implies that both forecast models in (7) are misspecified and allows for the possibility that Model Π delivers superior predictions than Model Y. Adam (2004) shows that Model Π outperforms Model Y whenever the elasticity of labor supply ε is larger than some critical value ε c , where ε c ≈ 11 As is easy to see, no other RPE in Model Y exists.
1.75 for τ ≈ 0. For labor supply elasticities below the critical value, the RPE in Model Π ceases to exist. 12 The behavior of output and inflation for the RPE in Model Π is simulated in Figure 1 . 13 Output and inflation display persistent deviations from steady state and regular cyclical patterns. Nominal demand shocks thus strongly propagate through the economy.
To simplify terminology the remainder of the paper refers to an RPE in Model Y as the model's Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) and reserve the term Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) for the RPE in Model Π.
The Experiments

Implementation
Experiments took place at the University of Salerno, Italy and at the University of Frankfurt, Germany. In each experimental session five subjects participated with no subject taking part in more than one session. Most subjects were undergraduate business and engineering majors.
At the start of the experiments subjects receive written instructions, which are reproduced in appendix 9.5. Instructions inform subjects that they have to repeatedly forecast future inflation rates and how their pay is related to their forecasting performance. Subjects neither know the steady state values of output and inflation nor any other feature of the underlying economy. Subjects are then introduced to the MacroLab software package, which is used to implement the experiments. 14 The experiment evolves as follows. In any period t subjects observe the history of output and inflation up to period t − 1 and are asked to forecast inflation for periods t and t + 1. 15 Importantly, subjects can enter any forecast they wish. Agents know nothing about rational forecasts, Model Y forecasts, or Model Π forecasts. Subjects' predictions for period t and t + 1, respectively, are then averaged across agents and substituted into the temporary equilibrium (3), which determines the output level and inflation 12 Model Y forecasts then always outperform the predictions generated by Model Π and the REE is the only equilibrium. 13 The figure assumes ε = 2, y = 100, Π = 1.04, and v t ∼ iiU [−1, 1], which is the parameterization used in most of the experiments later.
14 The software is available from the author upon request. 15 At the start of the experiment subjects observe just a single data point for output and inflation. rate for period t. 16 The new values for output and inflation are announced to subjects and subjects receive points for past forecasts of the newly announced inflation rate. Thereafter, the process repeats itself.
The points earned during an experimental treatment are added up and converted into cash payments according to a linear conversion rate announced at the end of the experimental session. Conversion rates were calculated to make an average payment of 30 Euros for subjects participating in single treatment sessions and 60 Euros (50 Euros) for subjects participating in double treatment sessions in Germany (Italy). The average hourly payment per session was in all cases larger than 12 Euros (8 Euros) in Germany (Italy).
Sessions and Treatments
Six experimental sessions with two different experimental treatments have been implemented. Table 1 lists details of the experimental sessions and treatments.
As a baseline scenario I consider a high-elasticity treatment, in which the elasticity of labor supply is set to ε = 2. In high-elasticity treatments a RPE coexists with the REE, whenever agents restrict attention to the set of simple forecasting models (7).
Treatment 1 of Sessions 1 to 4 are the baseline experiments for assessing the performance of the REE and RPE in such high-elasticity treatments. To check for the stability of the results over time, subjects participating in Sessions 3 and 4 are subjected to a second high-elasticity treatment.
As a further robustness check I consider low-elasticity treatments, in which the elasticity of labor supply is set to ε = 1. This is done in Sessions 5 and 6. In low-elasticity economies the REE is the only equilibrium, even if agents restrict consideration to simple forecasts functions.
Since the other model parameters do not affect the existence of the REE and RPE, their values are kept constant across all sessions and treatments. In particular, the steady state inflation rate is set equal to 4%, the steady state output is equal to 100, and
Treatments in Sessions 1 to 4 last for 55 model periods and treatments in Sessions 5 and 6 for 45 periods. 18 Overall, 420 model periods were generated and 4200 individual inflation forecasts have been collected.
Output and Inflation in the Experiments
Figures 2 and 3 depict the output and inflation series, respectively, from the baseline experiments. In all experiments, output and inflation display regular and persistent deviations from steady state. Also, convergence to white noise behavior does not seem to take place within the 55 model periods for which the experiments are run.
The behavior of output and inflation in the experiments can be confronted with the RPE prediction for a high-elasticity treatment, which is given by
This follows from equation (9) and
where the equilibrium values (α * Π , β * Π ) are derived in appendix 9.3. A simulation of equations (10) is given in Figure 1 . The figure illustrates that the simulated output and inflation series from the RPE are largely consistent with the experimental outcomes.
A more formal approach can be taken by considering the autocorrelations of output and inflation. Equations (10) imply that in the RPE corr(y t , y t−1 ) ≈ 0.70
This differs notably from the REE, which predicts these correlations to equal zero. Table 2 lists the autocorrelations for output and inflation from the baseline experiments. All correlations are of the sign predicted by the RPE and in all but one case significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.
The previous observations provide a first indication that the outcome from the baseline experiments are more in line with the RPE prediction than the REE prediction. Clearly, the evidence presented above is far from conclusive and a formal analysis of the experimental data is provided in the next section.
Analysis of Experimental Results
This section analyzes how well the REE and RPE can explain the experimental outcomes. This is done by evaluating the ability of these equilibria to explain the inflation forecasts entered by the subjects participating in the experiments. This is motivated by the fact that any deviation of output and inflation from white noise behavior is, by definition, driven by deviations of actual expectations from rational expectations.
Throughout the paper consideration is restricted to the inflation forecast of the 'representative subject', i.e., the average forecasts across the subjects participating in any given experimental session. Matching the average forecasts is justified on the grounds that output and inflation dynamics in the experimental economies are driven by average forecasts, see section 5.1. The equilibrium notion capturing the forecasts of the 'representative agent' thus also captures the behavior of output and inflation.
Rational inflation forecasts are given by 19
while in a RPE inflation expectations are given by 20
The subsequent sections compare the inflation forecasts entered by subjects in the experiments to the REE forecast functions (12) and the RPE forecast functions (13).
The Unconditional Inflation Forecasts
In a first step I consider the average inflation forecasts across agents and model periods. Such average forecasts can be interpreted as an estimate of the representative agent's unconditional inflation forecast.
REE and RPE both predict unconditional 1-step and 2-step forecasts to be equal to the steady state inflation rate. Unconditional forecasts, therefore, do not allow to discriminate between the REE and RPE. Yet, agents are not informed about the steady state inflation rate and unconditional forecasts allow to evaluate whether REE and RPE are able to capture the first moment of subjects' inflation expectations. Table 3 lists the average 1-step and 2-step inflation forecasts for our experimental sessions. Of the 16 values reported, 12 are within 2 standard deviations and 15 within 3 standard deviations of the steady state value (4%). 21 The average inflation forecasts in the experiments thus are in line with the predictions of the RPE and REE.
The subsequent sections will consider conditional inflation forecasts. Since conditional forecasts differ across the REE and RPE, they will allow to discriminate between the two equilibrium explanations.
The Baseline Experiments
This section analyzes the baseline experiments, i.e., Treatment 1 of Sessions 1 to 4. In these treatments the REE and RPE coexist, provided agents restrict consideration to simple forecast models.
Figures 4 to 7 depict the actual forecasts, the REE-forecasts (12), and the RPE-forecasts (13) for the four baseline treatments. RPE-forecasts track actual forecasts extremely well, while the REE-forecasts perform rather poorly. This is true for all 1-step forecasts and the 2-step forecasts in Sessions 2 and 4. For the 2-step forecasts of Sessions 1 and 3 this seems to hold only for about the first half of the treatment; in the second half the REE and RPE-forecasts seem to perform equally bad at the 2-step horizon.
The evidence in Figures 4 to 7 provides strong support in favor of the RPE. The close fit between RPE-forecasts and actual forecasts is remarkable since the RPE-forecast is calculated without reference to agents' actual forecasts, i.e., the two curves have not been fitted to each other! The equilibrium forecasts shown in these figures rely only on information that is available to agents at the time they formulate their forecasts and then assume that the economy is either in the REE or the RPE, respectively.
The visual impression from Figures 4 to 7 is confirmed by a more formal analysis. To assess how well the REE and RPE explain the inflation forecasts of the experiments, I report OLS-estimates of the parameter β for the following regression
where t Π actual t+i denotes the actual time t forecast of the t + i inflation rate (i = 1, 2) and t Π REE t+i and t Π RP E t+i the corresponding equilibrium forecasts in a REE and RPE, respectively, as given by equations (12) and (13). The estimate of β can be interpreted as the share of agents using the RPEforecasts. An estimate of β close to 1 indicates that the RPE explains the forecast functions well, while a value close to zero indicates that the REE offers a superior description of the forecast function. 22 The first panel of Table 4 reports the estimated share of RPE-forecasters β for the 1-step inflation forecasts. Estimates are reported for the entire treatment and the last 20 periods to assess whether there is some variation over time due to learning processes taking place.
The point estimates in the upper panel of Table 4 are relatively close to 1 and imply that in each treatment more than 85% of agents use RPEforecasts. The shares are estimated rather precisely and there are only weak signs (in Session 1 and 3) that they are significantly lower in the last 20 periods of the treatments.
The second panel of Table 4 reports the share of RPE-forecasters for the 2-step forecasts. Here the situation differs across the four sessions, which should hardly be surprising given the evidence shown in the lower panels of Figures 4 to 7. The RPE-forecasts clearly dominate in Sessions 2 and 4. Also, in these sessions the dominance of RPE-forecasts appears to be stable over time. RPE-forecasts also perform well in the first part of Sessions 1 and 3. Yet, the estimates for the last 20 periods suggest that towards the end of the treatment the performance of RPE deteriorates. 23 Overall, however, the baseline experiments provide overwhelming evidence in favor of the RPE. In none of the session does the REE offer a good description of the inflation expectations entered by subjects in the experiments.
Figure 8 provides additional support for this claim by depicting actual inflation rates together with the forecasted rates from Session 4. 24 If forecasts are rational, then the difference between the actual and forecasted inflation series are white noise. However, as is easy to spot in Figure 8 , inflation 22 Sometimes this interpretation is not appropriate, e.g. because the R 2 is very low or even negative. When this is the case it will be explicitely mentioned. 23 Clearly, the performance of REE 2-step forecasts does not improve towards the end of Sessions 1 and 3. As Figures 4 and 6 reveal actual 2-step forecasts still display regular cyclical patterns with relatively large amplitudes. 24 The graphs for the other sessions look very similar.
forecasts lag actual inflation. 25 As a result, forecast errors are strongly positively autocorrelated. This feature is consistent with the RPE but not with the REE.
The next subsection analyzes the data from Sessions 1 and 3 in greater detail. In these sessions the performance of RPE 2-step forecasts deteriorated towards the end of the treatment.
What Happened in Sessions 1 and 3 ?
Figure 9 depicts actual 2-step forecasts from Sessions 1 and 3 together with the following output-based forecast function:
Towards the end of the considered sessions, agents' 2-step forecasts seem to be captured rather well by equation (14). Moreover, forecasts (14) start to perform well precisely when the performance of the RPE-forecasts starts to deteriorate, see Figures (4) and (6). This suggests that agents participating in Sessions 1 and 3 have substituted their RPE 2-step forecast function (13b) with the output-based forecast function (14).
Forecast function (14) is the optimal simple 2-step inflation forecast for an economy that is in a RPE, as the data suggest to be the case for the first half of the considered sessions.
It might come as a surprise that the optimal simple 2-step forecast function differs from the RPE 2-step forecast function (13b). 26 RPE 2-step forecasts are suboptimal because they are obtained by iterating forward the optimal simple 1-step forecast equation (13a). Although such an iteration is the standard procedure in econometrics to derive a multi-step prediction from a linear econometric model, it is suboptimal here since the 1-step forecast function is misspecified, see Bhansali (2002) for details.
Instead of iterating 1-step forecasts, a superior simple 2-step forecast is obtained by regressing inflation directly on twice lagged output or twice lagged inflation. Doing so one finds that function (14) delivers the optimal simple forecast when the economy is in a RPE.
The somewhat informal discussion above can be supported by a more formal analysis. The lower panel of Table 4 lists the OLS-estimate of β 25 The figure depicts the actual inflation rate and past forecasts of this inflation rate at the same point of the x-axis, so this feature is not due to a problem of representation.
26 Optimality should again be interpreted as minimizing the mean squared forecast errors.
obtained from the regression
where t Π
Output t+2
denotes the forecast given in equation (14).
While Sessions 2 and 4 do not show any signs of an increased share of output-based forecasters, there is a significant increase in the share of output-based 2-step forecasters in Sessions 1 and 3. The point estimates imply that the large majority of agents used output-based forecasts during the last 20 periods of the treatment.
The previous findings suggest that agents' in Sessions 1 and 3 have become aware that their iterated 2-step forecast is suboptimal and have started to use different forecast models for different forecast horizons. The new 2-step forecast seems again to be based on a simple forecast function but conditions on a different variable than the 1-step forecast.
Robustness Check I: Additional High-Elasticity Treatments
To check for the stability of the results from the baseline experiments, subjects participating in Sessions 3 and 4 are subjected to an additional highelasticity treatment. The results of these treatments are analyzed in this section.
Results from the previous section suggest that subjects in some of the baseline experiments switched to output-based 2-step forecasts. One can thus ask for the potential rest points of a learning process where agents condition 1-step forecasts on inflation and 2-step forecasts on output. Such a rest point could be expected to emerge in the additional high-elasticity treatments analyzed in this section.
Appendix 9.4 shows that there exists a unique stationary rest point where agents use an optimal inflation-based 1-step forecast and an optimal outputbased 2-step forecast. 27 This rest point will be referred to as the mixedforecast situation subsequently. The forecast functions in the mixed-forecast situation are given by 
Importantly, equations (15) do not describe an equilibrium, i.e., a situation where agents use optimal simple forecast functions for each forecast horizon. 27 Optimality is again defined in terms of mean-squared errors.
If agents use equations (15) to forecast, a univariate output-based 1-step forecast would dominate the inflation-based forecast (15a). The mixed forecast situation is thus only a rest-point when taking as given the variables that enter the respective forecast functions.
Despite this suboptimality, one can reasonably expect that equations (15) at least initially describe subjects' actual forecast behavior. Clearly, once agents substitute the inflation-based 1-step forecast (15a) by an outputbased forecast, the REE should emerge. 28 To assess whether convergence to the REE occurs, this section compares the mixed-forecasts 15against the REE forecasts.
Importantly, the coefficient on lagged inflation in equation (15a) has the same sign as in the RPE. 29 Furthermore, the coefficient on lagged output in equation (15b) has the same sign as in equation (14). Therefore, the learning process should not cause major problems for the analysis.
Figures 10 and 11 depict actual forecasts, REE forecasts, and mixed forecasts for the second treatments of Sessions 3 and 4. Interpretation of the data from Session 3 is somewhat difficult because one subject experimented with large negative inflation forecasts in period 16-22 to learn about the economy's reaction to these forecasts. 30 The figures suggest that in both sessions 1-step forecasts are still captured far better by the (inflation-based) mixed-forecast than by the (outputbased) REE-forecast. This is confirmed by the quantitative evidence presented in Table 5 . The share of agents using the (inflation-based) mixed forecast function is estimated to be close to one and is not significantly lower in the last 20 periods of the treatments. Thus, regarding 1-step forecasts there is no evidence in favor of a convergence process towards the REE. 31 At the same time the mixed-forecast situation captures 1-step forecasts rather well.
Figures 10 and 11 also suggests that 2-step forecasts seem to be more 28 Recall that the REE is the unique stationary equilibrium where the parameters in agents' output-based forecast functions are optimal given the process of output and inflation that they generate. Moreover, this REE is stable under least-squares learning. 29 This might explain why in all baseline experiments agents' actual 1-step forecasts remain to be captured rather well by the RPE 1-step forecasts even though 2-step RPEforecasts have been replaced by output-based forecasts in some of these sessions. 30 The subject mentioned to me that he experimented after the end of the experiment. He also mentioned that he had abandoned experimentation after a while as it became to costly and did not generate a lot of information. 31 There is some evidence that actual forecasts initially fluctuate more than the mixed 1-step forecasts (15a) suggest. This is likely to be the case because agents still use the RPE-forecast, which has a larger coefficient on the lagged inflation term.
in line with the mixed-forecasts than with the REE-forecasts, in particular towards the end of the treatments.
The visual impression is again confirmed by the quantitative results reported in the second and third panel of Table 5 . The second panel shows that the mixed-forecast function dominates in Session 4 and seems to gain weight in Session 3, where interpretation is hampered by the fact that one subject experimented with large negative forecasts. The third panel illustrates that almost all agents seem to use output-based forecast rules.
Overall, the additional high-elasticity treatments suggest that agents' forecast functions moved into the direction of the mixed forecast situation (15), which offers a better prediction than both the REE forecasts and the RPE forecasts. Thus, after more than 110 model periods the REE does not yet emerge as the dominant explanation of the data. Of course, this does not exclude that additional treatments would eventually cause it to become the dominant explanation. Given the logic according to which agents seem to substitute their forecast functions, the mixed forecast situation can be expected to be transient. Investigating this issue is left for further research.
Robustness Check II: Low Elasticity Treatments
This section discusses the results obtained from the low-elasticity treatments in Sessions 5 and 6. In a low-elasticity economy the RPE does not exist even if agents restrict attention to the class of simple forecast functions (7).
Figure 12 depicts actual forecasts and REE-forecasts from Session 5. While in the first 25 periods the REE 1-step forecasts tend to peak before actual forecasts, the REE and actual forecasts move in a highly synchronized fashion after some time. Towards the end of the experimental treatment the fit between the two forecasts seems to be much better than after the 110 periods of high-elasticity treatment applied in Sessions 3 and 4.
While the 2-step forecasts still display some cyclical variation, the standard deviation of 2-step forecasts is rather small. The 2-step forecasts thus seem to be roughly in line with the REE prediction. Figure 13 displays information from Session 6. Interpretation of the data is complicated by the fact that in period 12 one subject entered a 1-step inflation forecast of -28%. 32 This caused inflation to be very low and output to be very high. The high output level subsequently caused a strong rise in inflation. This strong cyclical 'swing' in the data might well have influenced agents' forecast functions. Correspondingly, the signs in favor of the REE are much weaker for this session. 1-step forecasts peak well before actual forecasts even towards the end of the treatment. Also, 2-step forecasts do not move as closely to the steady state value as in Session 5 although variability seems to decrease over time.
The visual impression from Figures 12 and 13 is confirmed by a more formal analysis. Since an RPE does not exist in low-elasticity treatments, one has to compare the ability of REE-forecasts to explain actual forecasts with the ability to do so in high elasticity treatments. Table 6 reports results of such a comparison for the 1-step forecasts. The table reports for all sessions and treatments the coefficient δ obtained from estimating equation
(16) using ordinary least squares.
While for the low-elasticity treatments δ is significant and positive, it is either insignificant or negative for the high-elasticity treatments. This together with the fact that δ is very high in the last 20 periods of Session 5 suggests that in low-elasticity treatments the REE-forecasts offers a much better explanation of actual 1-step forecasts than in high-elasticity treatments. Table 7 reports evidence on 2-step forecasts. The table presents results from regressing on a constant the squared deviation of actual 2-step forecasts from REE 2-step forecasts. For Session 5 the estimated constant is significantly lower than in all other high elasticity sessions. This holds true for the whole sample and the last 20 periods of the treatment. For Session 6 the picture is somewhat mixed, which is most likely due to the large negative forecast mentioned above. Nevertheless, in the last 20 periods of Session 6 the squared deviation is still significantly lower than in all but one high-elasticity treatment.
The previous evidence indicates that in low-elasticity treatments the REE performs significantly better than in high-elasticity sessions. Especially evidence from Session 5 seems largely consistent with the REE towards the end of the treatment. This has not been the case in any of the high-elasticity treatments.
Conclusions
The experiments show that deviations of expectations from rational expectations can play an important role in enhancing the internal propagation mechanisms of simple economic models and may contribute to explaining the persistence of output and inflation in response to nominal shocks.
In the baseline experiments the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium outperforms the Rational Expectations Equilibrium as the dominant explanation of the experimental data. This suggests that the forecasting technology employed by relatively unsophisticated forecasters can be captured by forecast functions that use a single explanatory variable. Although agents use a simple forecasting technology, they seem to be aware that their forecast models are possibly misspecified. Therefore, after having gained experience with their environment, agents start to use different forecast models for different forecast horizons. The experiments suggest that the new forecast models are again simple models.
Clearly, there is considerable room left for future research. To assess the robustness of the present results it is of interest to learn whether Restricted Perceptions Equilibria with simple forecast function also capture expectations in other experimental economies. Furthermore, the results obtained so far suggest to consider an experimental economy possessing a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium where forecasts are optimal at each forecast horizon. Consideration of such an economy would allow to assess whether Restricted Perceptions Equilibria can be truly stable over time or whether they are just transitory phenomena of an economy ultimately converging to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium.
Appendix
Details of the structural model
Below I outline a highly stylized business cycle model with monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) ) where firms set prices one period in advance. In slight deviation from a standard setup there are two kinds of agents: entrepreneurs who own monopolistically competitive firms and finance consumption using the monopolistic profits; workers who finance consumption by offering their work force on a competitive labor market. To make the distinction between workers and entrepreneurs economically relevant, contingent claim markets that would allow for risk sharing between workers and entrepreneurs are assumed to be unavailable. The previous setting insures that workers' labor supply decisions do not depend on current and expected future profits and this simplifies the analysis.
Entrepreneur i ∈ [0, 1] maximizes a standard utility function of the form
where c i t denotes consumption, m i t the entrepreneur's real money holdings at the end of period t, τ t the real value of a possibly negative government cash transfer, Π t the inflation factor from period t − 1 to t, and Φ i t the monopoly rents from ownership of firm i. The first constraint forces entrepreneurs to use money to pay for consumption goods. The second constraint is the flow budget constraint.
Each firm i produces an intermediate consumption good q i which is an imperfect substitute in the production of the aggregate consumption good c:
Profit maximization implies that each firm sets its price P i t as a fixed markup over expected production costs. When the production technology is linear in labor this implies
where P t denotes the price index of the final consumption good and w t the real wage. Dividing the previous equation by P t−1 and assuming that all entrepreneurs and firms have identical expectations delivers
Equation (17) summarizes optimal behavior by firms. Next, consider workers. Each worker j ∈ [0, 1] chooses consumption c j t
and labor supply n j t to maximize
< 1 for all c ≥ 0, and the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, utility maximization implies a labor supply function of the form: 33
Inverting this labor supply function with respect to the first argument delivers an expression for the real wage:
where the linearity of the production function has been used to substitute n t by y t . Given the specified utility functions, the real wage increases in the demand for labor and in the expected inflation tax. Finally, consider the government which issues money via lump sum transfers. 34 The government's behavior implies that real money balances evolve according to
where τ t is a mean zero white noise shock with small bounded support and is the only source of randomness in the model. When prices are preset and the cash-in-advance constraint is binding for all agents, output is demand determined in the short run and the previous equation is a specification of the demand side of the economy. 35 This implies that output can be written as
which is equation (2). Substituting (18) into (17) delivers (1). The linearization coefficients (4) and (5) are obtained from (17) and (18) using the following equations to simplify expressions:
Equations (20) and (21) are steady state versions of (17) and (18), respectively, and (22) follows from applying the implicit function theorem to workers' first order condition with a binding cash-in-advance constraint.
Uniqueness of REE
To prove uniqueness, I derive the Blanchard-Kahn form of model (3). Since Π t is predetermined, E t Π t+1 = Π t+1 in any REE. This allows us to write model (3) as 
where y t−1 and Π t are 'predetermined'. Inverting the matrix on the l.h.s., the resulting matrix in front of the endogenous variables on the r.h.s. has two eigenvalues equal to zero and another eigenvalue equal to ε+1 Πε . Thus, as long as ε+1 εΠ > 1, there exists a unique stationary REE. For τ sufficiently small, as has been assumed, Π ≈ 1 at the low inflation steady state and this inequality holds as long as ε > 0.
Calculating
In a stationary equilibrium the least squares estimates of Model Π are given by
where Π is the steady state inflation rate and where Π t evolves according to (9). Let B denote the AR-matrix in (9) and vec be the column-wise vectorization operator. Then taking variances on both sides of (9) and assuming stationarity implies that
where
. Equation (25) delivers the expression for the denominator in (23). From
one obtains the expression for the numerator in (23). Equation (23) thus implies that β Π solves
For the high-elasticity parameterization this equation has one real and two imaginary solutions for β Π . The value for α Π can be obtained from equation (24).
The Mixed Forecast Situation
Suppose agents use the following 1-step and 2-step forecast model:
where in a stationary equilibrium
and
where variables without subscript denote steady state values.
To calculate the variances and covariances insert the expectations derived from (27) into (3). This delivers
Since the constant a in (30) does not influence the covariances one can ignore it from now on. Taking variances on both sides of (30) delivers
where vec(·) denotes the vectorization operator and Ω is variance covariance matrix of the shocks, i.e.
Multiplying (30) by the once and twice lagged (y t , Π t ) row-vector and taking expectations delivers
where Γ i is the covariance matrix of output and inflation with i-times lagged output and inflation. Taking the variances and covariances from these expressions delivers
This equation for has two fixed points given by
which depend on δ. Substituting β 1 into (29) using the expressions for the covariances derived above and solving for δ with Π = 1.04 and ε = 2 delivers two real and two imaginary solutions for δ. However, both real solutions imply values for β 1 smaller than −1 which would contradict stationarity of the inflation rate. Substituting β 2 into (29) and solving for δ with Π = 1.04 and ε = 2 delivers three real solutions for δ. Only one of these solutions implies a value of |β 2 | < 1. This is the solution shown in equation (15).
Instructions for Subjects
General Today you will participate in an experiment of economic decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for the conduct of this research. Instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully you can earn a considerable amount of money. The average payment will be around 60.000 Lire but, depending on how well you do, you may well earn up to 120.000 Lire.
You are assigned the role of a private agent whose task is to forecast the rate of inflation in the economy. In each experimental period t, you are asked to forecast the inflation rate for the next two periods, i.e. the inflation rate for period t+1 and for period t+2.
In period t when you make your inflation predictions for t+1 and t+2 you can observe the current and past data of the economy. This data consists of the current and past inflation rates and the current and past levels of real GDP, where real GDP is the quantity of goods that is produced in the economy.
At the beginning of an experiment when you start forecasting, there is just a single data point that consists of the current inflation rate and output level. After you have made your forecasts the experiment period will end and a new experiment period will start for which a new inflation rate and output level will be announced. Thus, as the experiment evolves you will have an increasing number of observations. There will be various experiment 'sessions'. For each 'session' the economy will restart from period zero. Each session is unrelated to the previous session, in the sense that the level of inflation and output will be different across sessions. Also the relationships between inflation and output and past values of these variables is not necessarily the same from one session to another. The end of a session and the beginning of a new session will be clearly announced by the experimenter. During each period of an experiment session you will collect 'points' which at the end of the session will be transformed into Lira, as described below. The number of points that you get will depend on how close your inflation predictions are to the actual inflation rates. The details are explained now:
Earnings
Each period t, the new inflation rate and the new output level are announced. You will have predicted the current inflation rate two different times, once 1 period ago and once 2 periods ago.
Let f denote the absolute value of your forecast error from one of these forecasts. The error is expressed in percentage points, i.e. if f = 1.5 your forecast was either 1.5% higher or lower than the actual inflation rate.
The points that you receive will depend on the errors f you make where larger errors will give you less points. In particular, points are calculated in the following way
You can receive up to 300 points per forecast and may lose up to 100 points depending on the size of the forecast error. With a zero forecast error you would receive 300 points. However, if your forecast is 1% higher or lower than the actual inflation rate you will get only 100 points (400/2-100), likewise for a 3% forecast error you receive no points (300/3-100), and for even larger forecast errors points will be subtracted. The graph below shows the relationship between the forecast error and the points that your receive for your forecast.
You will receive points for each of the two forecast you made for the current inflation rate, i.e. you receive points for the forecast you made 1 period ago and points for the forecast you made 2 periods ago, where the number of points for each forecast depends on the forecast error as described above.
After the experimenter has announced the end of an experiment session, write down the total number of points that you received on a sheet of paper with your name on it. Briefly after the end of the session, the experimenter will announce a conversion rate that indicates the value of the points in terms of Lira.
Other Instructions
During the experiment sessions it is strictly forbidden to speak with other students that participate in the experiment. Doing so can lead to the exclusion from the experiment. In this case no payment will be made. If you have any questions or problems during the course of the experiment raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you.
At the start of each experiment session you will be asked to start the program that runs on your computer. Please carefully follow the instructions that you will receive from the experimenter.
If you have any questions please ask them now! The highlighted treatments and sessions constitute the baseline experiments. 'low' indicates treatments where the elasticity of labor supply is given by ε = 1.0; 'high' indicates treatments where the elasticity is given by ε = 2.0. 
